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Evidence--State v. Freeman: Adverse Marital Testimony in
North Carolina Criminal Actions-Can Spousal Testimony
Be Compelled?
Prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Free-
man1 adverse testimony by one spouse against another in a criminal action
2
was deemed incompetent and therefore inadmissible.3 This common-law rule
of incompetent spousal testimony prohibited the state from calling as a witness
the husband or wife of any criminal defendant, with certain, limited, statutory
exceptions. 4 In Freeman the court announced a major modification of the
common-law rule by holding that henceforth the spouse of a criminal defend-
ant shall be an incompetent witness for the state only when the substance of
the testimony concerns a "confidential communication" between the marriage
partners made during the duration of their marriage.5
The facts of the case presented the court with a compelling setting for
modifying the common-law rule. Defendant Freeman was indicted for first-
degree murder. Defendant's wife of three years (though she and her husband
had been separated for the last two) was prepared to testify that on June 6,
1980, she saw her husband shoot and kill her brother as she and her brother
sat in an automobile outside Mrs. Freeman's place of employment. 6 The trial
court granted defendant's motion in limine to suppress the testimony on the
ground that under the common law of North Carolina, codified at G.S. 8-57,7
a spouse is incompetent to testify against a defendant-spouse in a criminal
1. 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
2. Adverse spousal testimony in most civil actions is competent and compellable. Excep-
tions include actions for divorce on account of adultery and actions for criminal conversation.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1981).
3. The common-law rule is expressed in State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 123 (1852).
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981) provides:
The husband or wife of the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings, shall be a
competent witness for the defendant, but the failure of such witness to be examined shall
not be used to the prejudice of the defense. Every such person examined as a witness
shall be subject to be cross-examined as are other witnesses. No husband or wife shall be
compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during
their marriage. Nothing herein shall render any spouse competent or compellable to
give evidence against the spouse in any criminal action or proceeding, except to prove
the fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annulment in
cases of bigamy and in cases of criminal cohabitation in violation of the provisions of
G.S. 14-183, and except that in all criminal prosecutions of a spouse for communicating
a threat to the other spouse, or in any criminal prosecution of a spouse for trespass in or
upon the separate residence of the other spouse when living separate and apart from
each other by mutual consent or by court order, or for any criminal offense against a
legitimate or illegitimate or adopted or foster minor child of either spouse, or for aban-
donment, or for neglecting to provide for the spouse's support, or the support of the
children of such spouse, it shall be lawful to examine a spouse in behalf of the State
against the other spouse: Provided that this section shall not affect pending litigation
relating to a criminal offense against a minor child.
5. 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
6. Id. at 592-93, 276 S.E.2d at 451-52.
7. See note 4 supra.
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proceeding. 8 The state immediately appealed the order pursuant to G.S. 15A-
979(c),9 certifying that Mrs. Freeman was the only witness who could testify to
the above stated facts, and that her testimony was essential to the case.
Before modifying the rule, the court first had to hold that G.S. 8-57 did
not codify the common-law rule prohibiting adverse spousal testimony in
criminal trials. The statutory language on which the trial court relied was the
portion of G.S. 8-57 that reads: "Nothing herein shall render any spouse com-
petent or compellable to give evidence against the other spouse in any criminal
action or proceeding. . ... 0o The supreme court acknowledged that if this
language did in fact codify the common-law rule, the court was without power
to modify it judicially. 11 The court previously had addressed this precise issue
in State v. Alford,12 in 'which it modified the common-law rule to permit a
divorced spouse to testify against her ex-husband-defendant.' 3 There the
court held that G.S. 8-57 simply provides that in all proceedings not specifi-
cally excepted in the statute, common-law rules with reference to whether one
spouse is competent to testify against another are unaffected by the statute.
The court observed that the portion of G.S. 8-57 quoted above differs from the
portion immediately preceding it. The latter provides directly and positively
that "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential
communication made by one to the other during their marriage."' 14 The court
reasoned that the legislature would have used similarly definitive language
had it intended to state positively that adverse spousal testimony in general
was incompetent.' 5 It concluded that by using nondefinitive language the leg-
islature simply was expressing no opinion on this aspect of the common-law
rule. Thus, absent any legislative declaration, the supreme court possesses the
authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems such action
necessary "in light of experience and reason."' 1
6
With the statutory impediment thereby removed, the court proceeded to
reassess the continuing validity of the spousal incompetency rule. After a brief
8. 302 N.C. at 592, 276 S.E.2d at 451.
9. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981) allows an immediate appeal of a supe-
rior court order granting a motion to suppress evidence if the prosecutor certifies that the appeal is
not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is essential to the case.
When this section and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a) (1981), which provides for a direct appeal
to the supreme court in capital offense cases, are considered together, it is proper to appeal a
suppression order directly to the supreme court if the punishment for the charge is either death or
life imprisonment. State v. Silhan, 295 N.C. 636, 639-40, 247 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1978).
10. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452. See note 4 supra for full text of the provision.
11. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
12. 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968).
13. The court in Freeman could have held that a two-year separation was the equivalent of
divorce for purposes of the spousal privilege, but it expressly declined to do so. The reason behind
the abolition of the privilege in divorced spouses could apply equally in this case-there is no true
marital relationship to protect. The court declined to so hold for two reasons: (1) public policy
favors encouraging reconciliation between separated spouses, and (2) the courts would be unduly
burdened if required to make findings on the possibility of reconciliation in each case. 302 N.C. at
598 n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 455 n.2.
14. 274 N.C. at 129, 161 S.E.2d at 578.
15. Id.
16. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
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discussion of the historical development of the rule,17 the court concluded that
the doctrine prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other remains
in effect solely by force of the modem justification of encouraging free and
open communication between marriage partners. It is thought that open com-
munication might be impaired if spouses run the risk of a subsequent betrayal
of confidence.18 A rule that prohibits all adverse spousal testimony "sweeps
more broadly"' 9 than its purpose and therefore should be modified. Open
communication between marriage partners could be encouraged just as effec-
tively by a rule that limits the exclusion of testimony only if its substance con-
cers a confidential communication.20
. The narrow holding of Freeman is that nonconfidential adverse spousal
testimony in criminal proceedings is now competent. The court did not ad-
dress the question whether such testimony is also compellable.21 It is submit-
ted, however, that because the court recognized the sole justification for the
rule as existing in the policy of encouraging free and open communication in
the marriage, it inadvertently may have suggested an affirmative answer to this
question. This note examines two additional modem justifications for the
common-law rule-maintaining peace between the marriage partners and
avoiding the moral repugnance of forcing one spouse to condemn a life-long
partner-both of which support a rule that makes adverse spousal testimony
noncompellable.
At the outset it is important to distinguish between three separate com-
mon-law exclusionary doctrines: the privilege against adverse marital testi-
mony in general; the disqualification of one spouse to testify on the other's
behalf; and the privilege for confidential communications between husband
17. The court in one sentence surveyed the historic origins of the privilege. Id. This sen-
tence, however, describes the genesis of an entirely distinct rule of common law, the disqualifica-
tion of favorable spousal testimony. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
18. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453. The notion that open communication might be im-
paired if spouses were subject to the risk of betrayal is similar in rationale to the privileges for
communications between attorney and client, doctor and patient, and clergyman and penitent.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See Guy v. Avery County Bank, 206 N.C. 322,
173 S.E. 600 (1934) (attorney); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199, 139 S.E, 228(1927) (physician).
19. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
20. The court stated that in determining whether a particular segment of testimony includes a
"confidential communication" within the meaning of the rule adopted in this case, deference
should be given to its previous decisions interpreting the term under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1981),
the statute preserving a privilege in civil actions not to testify about "confidential communica-
tions" with one's spouse. Id. at 597-98, 276 S.E. 2d at 454. These cases hold that the question is
whether the communication, whatever it contains, was induced by the marital relationship and
prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by such relationship. Hence, a
communication made in the known presence of a third person or a communication relating to
business matters which by their nature might be expected to be divulged are not protected. Hicks
v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967); 1 D. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence § 60, at
192 (H. Brandis rev. 1973). Interestingly, the rule laid down by the court-that confidential com-
munications between husband and wife are privileged in criminal actions-is already codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981): "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confi-
dential communication made by one to the other during their marriage."
21. Since Mrs. Freeman had volunteered her testimony, the court did not have to address the
issue of compellability. See State v. Byrd, 21 N.C. App. 734, 736, 205 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1974), for
the proposition that the privilege embodies distinct issues of competency and compellability.
[Vol. 60
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and wife. Judicial confusion of these doctrines has been frequent,22 and the
Freeman court commingled all three.
The origins of the common-law privilege against adverse marital testi-
mony in general are couched in obscurity.23 The privilege appeared as early
as 1580 in the case of Bent v. Allot 24 in which a husband was allowed to sup-
press the testimony of his wife when she was called as a witness for his oppo-
nent. While the original justification for the privilege is uncertain, Professor
Wigmore suggests that the court of chancery may have drawn upon analogies
to the Roman civil and the ecclesiastical law, which disqualified spouses, de-
pendents, parents and servants.25 This analogy fails, however, to explain why
the common-law judges privileged only spousal testimony while permitting
that of all other members of the defendant's household. 26 Professor Wigmore
concludes that perhaps the true explanation of the rule's origin lies in a "natu-
ral and strong repugnance" toward condemning a man by admitting to the
witness stand one who lived under his roof, shared the secrets of his domestic
life and depended on him for sustenance. 27 This would tend to explain why
nearly all the recorded instances of the privilege deal with the dependent
wife's testimony against her husband and not vice versa.28
The disqualification of favorable spousal testimony first appeared as an
established principle around 1628 when the English courts generally recog-
nized any "interest" as a ground for disqualification. 29 The conclusion that
the privilege arose before the disqualification is evident from the observation
by the court in Bent v. Allot that the defendant would have been permitted to
call his wife to testify on his behalf.30 The disqualification branch of the rule
was premised on two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the accused
himself was prevented from testifying because of his interest in the outcome;
and second, testimony from the wife was the legal equivalent of testimony
from the husband, because husband and wife were considered a single legal
22. Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications Between Husband and Wife, 15 N.C.L.
Rev. 282, 283 (1937).
23. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580). The privilege was engraved firmly into the common law in
the early part of the seventeenth centry when Lord Coke pronounced: "Note, it hath been resolved
by the justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband. ... and it might
be a cause of implacable discord and dissertation between the husband and wife. ... 1 E.
Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton § 6b (1628). The first recorded common-law exception to
this rule came only three years later in Lord Audley's Trial, 123 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1631), in which
the judges resolved that the wife could be a witness against her husband for rape upon her. This
common-law exception is codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981), reproduced at note 4 supra.
25. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 600 (3d ed. 1940); 8 id. § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
26. See State v. Parish, 104 N.C. 679, 10 S.E. 457 (1889) (daughter against father); 8 J. Wig-
more, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
28. Id.
29. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 600 (3d ed. 1940). Lord Coke's pronouncement in 1628 (see
note 24 supra) is the first recorded utterance of the disqualification of favorable spousal testimony.
Lord Coke's coupling of the privilege and the disqualification in the same sentence may have
contributed to the confusion of the two doctrines. Reference to the disqualification first appeared
in North Carolina in the case of Beatty's Heirs v. [sic], I N.C. (Tay.) 104 (1799).
30. 21 Eng. Rep. at 50.
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The privilege for communications between husband and wife did not ap-
pear until the middle of the nineteenth century.32 This privilege was unneces-
sary until the statutory modification of the rules concerning marital
disqualification and privilege against adverse testimony, and this modification
explains its delayed recognition.33 The motivation for the privilege was to
instill confidence between marital partners34 by encouraging open
communications.
The court in Freeman was confronted with only the first of these doc-
trines, the privilege against adverse marital testimony. In its analysis of the
reasons for the privilege, however, it introduced aspects of all three rules and,
not surprisingly, mingled the relevant issues. The court adopted as the histori-
cal origin of the privilege against adverse testimony the original justification
for the disqualification of favorable testimony-the disqualification of the
spouse based upon the defendant's interest in the outcome coupled with the
marital unity concept of medieval law.35 After summarily dismissing this jus-
tification as anachronistic, the court turned to the modern reason for the rule:
to encourage interspousal communication 36 -the very motivation for the sepa-
rate privilege for confidential communications 37 -and concluded that this
31. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 601 (3d ed. 1940). The disqualification in criminal actions was
abolished by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981), which reads in pertinent part, "The husband or wife of
the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings, shall be a competent witness for the defend-
ant .... Disqualification was the rule in federal courts until it was abolished in Frank v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
32. See, e.g., State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838); Hester v. Hester, 15 N.C.
(4 Dev.) 228 (1833).
33. Note, supra note 22, at 283 n.2.
34. State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838). Professor Wigmore argues that the
policy that should lie at the foundation of every rule of privileged communications (i.e., attorney-
client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, husband-wife) can be broken down into four requirements:
(1) the communications originate in confidence; (2) the confidence is essential to the relationship;
(3) the relation is a proper object of encouragement by the state; and (4) the injury that would
result by its disclosure is probably greater than the resulting benefit to the fact-finding process. 8
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2332 (McNaughton rev. 1961). He suggests that the fourth condition is
the only one subject to debate. Id.
The privilege for confidential marital communications is codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57
(1981). See note 20 supra.
35. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452. The North Carolina court is not alone in confusing
the origins of these two separate, exclusionary rules. The United States Supreme Court in Tram-
mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), made a similar mistake. The Trammel court did, how-
ever, recognize that it was dealing with two distinct rules, one a privilege vested in the defendant-
spouse and the other an outright disqualification for incompetent testimony. The North Carolina
court erroneously refers to both as rules of disqualification. See 302 N.C. at 594-95, 276 S.E.2d at
452.
36. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 452-53.
37. Why the court confused the justifications for these two privileges is a mystery. The
supreme court clearly distinguished between the two in State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d
575 (1968). Professor Wigmore treats the two as separate privileges, each having an entirely dis-
tinct justification. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2334 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Likewise, the
Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, which ostensibly was relied upon heavily in Free.
man, expressly stated that its decision did not affect the "independent rule protecting confidential
marital communications." 445 U.S. at 51. What is clear is that by citing the confidentiality justifi-
cation as supporting the privilege against adverse marital testimony in general, the court avoided
any independent analysis of the reasons for retaining the latter privilege.
[Vol. 60
AD VERSE MARITAL TESTIMONY
purpose could be served by the narrower rule, which recognized only a privi-
lege arising out of marital communications. This was not a very startling con-
clusion, given the assumed justification for the privilege. Had the court
focused its inquiry on other accepted justifications for the privilege against
adverse marital testimony, however, it might have reached a different result.
Since the genesis of the privilege against adverse marital testimony in the
sixteenth century, two theories in favor of retaining the common-law rule fre-
quently have been advanced by judges and commentators. The first and most
often employed of the modem justifications for the privilege is the preserva-
tion of peace and harmony in the marriage relationship. 38 It is thought that
condemning one's spouse might cause some discord between marriage part-
ners.39 The peace-and-harmony argument was given considerable attention
by the United States Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United States4° and more
recently in Trammel v. United States.41
In Hawkins defendant was convicted and sentenced to five years' impris-
onment by a United States district court for violating the Mann Act 42 by trans-
porting a girl across state lines for immoral purposes. Over defendant's
objection, the district court permitted the government to use his wife as a wit-
ness against him. In reversing the conviction the court deferred to the public
policy of promoting marital harmony:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a
belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not
only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit
of the public as well .... The wide-spread success achieved by
courts throughout the country in conciliating family differences is a
real indication that some apparently broken homes can be saved pro-
vided no unforgivable act is done by either party. Adverse testimony
given in a criminal proceeding would, we think, be likely to destroy
almost any marriage.
43
The rule laid down in Hawkins was later modified in Trammel when the
Court held that the government could use defendant's spouse as a witness, but
only if the testifying spouse consented. Thus, the spouse's testimony is compe-
38. The first recorded statement of this policy reason probably was Coke's pronouncement in
note 24 supra. For other early statements of the justification, see Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep.
171 (1736); F. Buller, Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius (1767), at 286(a) (7th
ed. R. Bridgman 1817) (1st ed. Dublin 1768).
39. Preservation of peace and harmony in the marriage, together with the marital identity
concept, was also the rationale behind the common-law rule prohibiting one spouse from suing
the other in tort. Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923). In 1951 the legislature
provided that husband and wife could sue each other in all tort actions. Note, Survey of Statutory
Changes: Torts Between Husband and Wife, 29 N.C.L. Rev. 395 (1951). That legislative change is
now codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-5 (1976).
40. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
41. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970).
43. 358 U.S. at 77-78.
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tent, but not compellable.44 In so holding, however, the Court did not suggest
that the preservation of marital harmony was no longer a viable justification
for the privilege. On the contrary, in vesting the privilege in the testifying
spouse, the Court reaffirmed its policy of furthering the "important public in-
terest in marital harmony. '45 The Court overruled Hawkins only because it
felt that when one spouse chooses to testify against the other there is little, if
any, marital harmony to protect. 46
The other argument supporting the privilege for adverse spousal testi-
mony approaches the issue as a simple value judgment: because the marital
relationship is based upon a deep and enduring trust between husband and
wife unequalled in any other human bond, the gains to society in nurturing
that trust and in avoiding the torment inherent in compelling a betrayal of that
trust outweigh the burdens placed upon the fact-finding process.
One application of this principle is stated by Professor Wigmore as a
"natural repugnance" in all fair-minded persons toward compelling a wife or
husband to be "the means of the other's condemnation," and toward compel-
ling the defendant to suffer "the humiliation of being condemned by the words
of his intimate life partner."47 Other commentators have emphasized the tor-
ment of the testifying spouse.48 The argument is that the testifying spouse is
presented with a painful moral dilemma-a choice between remaining loyal
through perjury or betraying the marital trust by telling the truth.
Whether to ensure the emotional stability of the testifying spouse or that
44. This is currently the rule in all federal criminal proceedings. See Labbe v. Berman, 621
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1980).
45. 445 U.S. at 53.
46. Id. at 52. The Court cited two contemporary reports as support for its view that marital
harmony deserves less protection when the spouse volunteers testimony. In 1965, California ter-
minated the privilege in the defendant-spouse, but vested it in the witness-spouse, accepting a
study commission recommendation that the "latter [was] more likely than the former to determine
whether or not to claim the privilege on the basis of the probable effect on the marital relation-
ship." Id. at 49-50 n.10 (citing Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § § 970-973 (West 1966) and 1 California
Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation and Study Relating to the Marital "For or Against"
Testimonial Privilege, at F-5 (1956)).
In 1972 a study group in England proposed vesting the privilege in the testifying spouse
alone, on the ground that "if [the wife] is willing to give evidence.., the law would be showing
excessive concern for the preservation of marital harmony if it were to say she must not do so."
445 U.S. at 50 n.10 (citing (British) Criminal Law Rev., Eleventh Report Evidence (General)
(1972) at 93.)
Professor Wigmore would take the argument even further, postulating that it is absurd to
assume that a normal, harmonious marriage is endangered solely by the obligation to testify unfa-
vorably. He continues, "[It is] a curious piece of policy by which the wrongdocr's own interests
are consulted in determining whether justice shall have its course against him." 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
47. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Because Professor Wigmore
finds the marital harmony argument unpersuasive, this value judgment is for him the sole strength
of the opposition to abolishing the privilege. For other statements of the natural repugnance to
condemning a man by the words of his spouse, see Mills v. United States, 1 Pin. 73 (Wis. 1839)
("indelible disgrace. . . and he may be the subject of the deepest mortification which a sensitive
being can endure."); Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 (1867) ('out of respect for the better feelings
of humanity").
48. See 2 Abbott, The Trial of Henry Ward Beecher [Tilton v. Beecher, City of Brooklyn,
N.Y.] (1875), cited in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
[Vol. 60
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of the defendant, the argument is in essence that society's interest in ascertain-
ing the truth does not outweigh the suffering inflicted upon the spouse. Profes-
sor Wigmore, after acknowledging that there is indeed a natural repugnance to
condemning a man by the testimony of his intimate life-partner, concludes
that the balance comes out in favor of admitting the testimony. He views the
argument as nothing more than idle sentiment.49 When a man has been ac-
cused of committing a crime, it is the "solemn business" of the law to find out
whether he is guilty, and in this inquiry there is no room for sentiment.50
Jeremy Bentham, when presented with the dilemma of the suffering testi-
fying spouse, took an even more dispassionate view when he proposed that
inflicting such punishment upon the spouse should act as a deterrent to the
prospective criminal.51 According to Bentham, not only is the torment of the
spouse an insufficient reason to impede our search for truth, it is also a poten-
tially effective method of crime prevention. 52
The positions taken by these two legal scholars may indeed reflect a
proper value judgment-perhaps the emotional distress to either spouse is so
insignificant that it is not worth protecting. On the other hand, if we assume
that there is some psychic trauma that can be prevented by a rule excluding
adverse spousal testimony, it may be that Wigmore, Bentham and others who
disparage the moral reprehensibility justification place too great an emphasis
on society's need to discover the truth and not enough on other equally valid
objectives of a system of justice. Privilege always excludes some testimony
that could aid in discovering the truth.53 If courts could coerce confessions in
violation of the fifth amendment, no doubt more guilty defendants would be
convicted, yet our system of justice does not tolerate such inhumane violations
of the human personality.54 Truth-at-all-costs never has been the rule. The
administration of justice was created for society, not society for the adminis-
tration of justice.55 If it is accepted that the trust reposed in the marriage
relationship is unequalled elsewhere, reasonable persons may determine that
our morals do not tolerate adverse marital testimony. Betrayal of this trust
indeed may be naturally repugnant and morally reprehensible.56 Dismissing
49. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50. Id.
51. 5 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 344 (London 1827). Bentham contends that
the privilege turns a man's home into a "den of thieves" Id. at 340.
52. Bentham's position is difficult to take seriously. Two of the argument's more obvious
defects are its obliviousness to the difficult position of the witness-spouse and the rule's almost
certainly negligible effect as a deterrent.
53. See Note, Evidence: Federal Courts: Adverse Testimony by Spouse of Accused in a
Criminal Prosecution, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 472, 474 (1936), which suggests that the basis of criticism
of the privilege is that the accused is thought to be guilty, while the presumption of law is that he
is innocent. The damage to marital harmony and suffering of a man wrongfully accused and
properly acquitted also must be considered.
54. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
55. 2 Abbott, supra note 48, at 49-50.
56. For a defense of the privilege on moral grounds, see Note, The Search for "Reason and
Experience" Under the Funk Doctrine, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 525 (1950).
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this moral judgment as mere "sentiment" which must defer to the "solemn
business" of ascertaining the truth misses the point.
Given that there is some public good to be gained, the question must be
whether the moral reprehensibility of one spouse's condemnation of the other
is sufficiently strong to overcome the burdens placed upon the fact-finding
process.57 The balance may not necessarily favor retention of the privilege. In
the first place, if any public good is to be gained by allowing the privilege, it
must be assumed that a husband and wife actually would be placed in a diffi-
cult moral dilemma when forced to testify about nonconfidential matters. Sec-
ond, it is not necessarily true that the trust reposed in the marital bond is
greater than that found in other close societal and familial relationships which
enjoy no similar privilege.58
The strength of both the value-based moral reprehensibility argument
and the marital harmony argument depends to some extent on whether or not
the testifying spouse is compelled to testify. From the testifying spouse's view-
point, the moral dilemma, real or not, is avoided by a rule that makes testi-
mony competent, but not compellable, as in the federal rule after Trammel. If
a spouse wishes to avoid the torment of betrayal under that rule, the alterna-
tive simply is to decline the invitation to testify.59 Similarly, the state's interest
in promoting marital harmony may be stronger in cases where a spouse re-
fuses to testify. If the view of the Supreme Court in Trammel is accepted, 60
there is more harmony to protect when one spouse elects not to condemn the
other.61
The Freeman decision has cast considerable doubt on the issue of the
compellability of adverse marital testimony in North Carolina. If the court
remains committed solely to the confidential communications justification for
57. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) for the proposition that because exclusionary rules
and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to all evidence,
they are permitted only in the limited circumstances of a transcendent public good.
58. See Anonymous, 123 Eng. Rep. 656 (1613) (son bound to testify against father, but wife is
not).
59. The decision not to testify may not be so simple in cases like Trammel, where the wife is
offered immunity in exchange for her testimony. This suggests that the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that Trammel's marriage probably was beyond repair may have been incorrect. It is possible
that a reasonably happily married spouse would choose to testify rather than face an extended
prison term.
60. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
61. On the other hand, a rule making adverse spousal testimony competent but not compella-
ble will not serve to lessen the humiliation of the defendant-spouse. In fact, assuming there is any
humiliation at all, a defendant-spouse arguably would be more embarrassed when his partner
chooses to testify than if the spouse were forced to do so.
Similarly, if any peace and harmony remain in the marriage of a cooperative spousal witness,
it may be promoted more effectively by a rule that prohibits even noncompelled testimony. As the
Court in Hawkins suggested, it seems probable that much more bitterness would be engendered by
voluntary condemnation than by compelled testimony. 358 U.S. at 77. The Supreme Court in
Trammel takes a contrary position. In a case where both spouses are potential defendants, the
state is unlikely to offer one of them immunity and lenient treatment if it knows that the other can
prevent the adverse testimony. Thus, the privilege can have the untoward effect of permitting one
spouse to escape justice at the expense of the other. This situation, the Court argues, hardly seems
conducive to preservation of marital harmony. 445 U.S. at 52-53.
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the privilege, it would follow that a spouse's testimony about nonconfidential
matters should be compellable as well as competent. The view that noncom-
municative adverse spousal testimony may be compellable derives from the
court's reasoning that the only modem justification for the privilege is to en-
courage open communication between marriage partners. The underlying ra-
tionale of the justification is that spouses will be less likely to confide in one
another if they know that the confidant may someday reveal the substance of
the conversation in court. Thus, in order to foster the policy, the privileged
testimony must concern some communication between spouses. If the sub-
stance of the testimony is not a confidential communiction (e.g., an eyewitness
account of a murder), then it makes little difference whether that testimony is
compelled or not. Free communication will not be inhibited at all by the fear
that one's spouse may someday be forced to testify about a noncommunicative
observation. 62 Nor will it be encouraged by the knowledge that one's spouse
cannot be required to testify to such an observation. Thus, on the facts of the
Freeman case and in any other situation where the testimony at issue does not
involve interspousal communications, an extension of the court's reasoning
would permit the spouse's testimony to be compelled.
The Freeman court was driven to reach its conclusion mainly because of
its failure to recognize the distinct policy reasons behind the general privilege
preventing all spousal testimony and the privilege preventing testimony about
confidential matters. In a future case that raises the compulsion issue, the
court should address and evaluate the competing policy interests behind the
general privilege and decide which are more legitimate. It may then decide to
align itself with the Trammel decision.63 However, because the court appar-
ently was cognizant of the new federal rule and of the rule's status in nearly
every other jurisdiction," it might be assumed that the members of the court
were aware of the policy reasons supporting retention of the privilege in the
testifying spouse and simply were not persuaded by them. But the fact that the
court did not address either of two longstanding justifications for the rule sug-
gests that such an assumption may not be warranted.
Promoting marital harmony and preventing the testifying spouse's moral
dilemma are legitimate goals of our judicial system. The court should recog-
nize their validity as justifications for the privilege against adverse spousal tes-
timony in criminal actions and, when the occasion arises, judiciously weigh
their importance against society's interest in ascertaining truth. If the court
62. One's freedom to commit incriminating acts in the presence of one's spouse arguably will
be inhibited by a rule that permits the state to compel testimony about those acts. It seems doubt-
ful, however, that the state should have an interest m protecting such behavior. Unlike the protec-
tion of confidential discourse, which encourages trust between husband and wife, the protection of
unlawful acts made in the presence of one's spouse appears to foster no legitimate state purpose.
63. Other jurisdictions are divided on the privilege. Seven states provide that spouses are
completely incompetent to testify against each other in a criminal proceeding. Sixteen states pro-
vide a privilege against adverse spousal testimony and vest the privilege in both spouses or in the
defendant-spouse alone. Nine states plus the District of Columbia vest a privilege in the witness-
spouse alone. The remaining seventeen states have abolished the privilege altogether. For statu-
tory citations, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9.
64. See 302 N.C. at 596 n.1, 276 S.E.2d at 453 n.l.
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perceives the potential harm to the marriage and testifying spouse as particu-
larly significant when the spouse is forced to testify, it should conclude that
society is better served by a rule that makes adverse spousal testimony compe-
tent but not compellable.
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